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Abstract 
This scholarly research investigates the recent recruitment of young British Muslim 
women by the Islamic State (IS) in an effort to determine the appeal of said group upon this 
demographic. Noting that such recruitment falls under the foreign fighter complex, which is 
usually male oriented, this research seeks to understand why IS is able to extend its appeal to 
young women. In so doing, many of the preexisting theories for extremism are examined and 
found to be irrelevant to this particular demographic. Thus, I am arguing that it is not poverty, 
lack of education, or other economic determinant as is commonly believed to be the roots of 
radicalization/extremism but rather a search for a personal identity these women feel is lacking, 
growing up as Muslims in an immigrant context in a non-Muslim country. 
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Introduction 
In February of 2015, newspaper headlines covered the story of three young British 
Muslim women who had gone missing while on holiday and were suspected to be en route to 
Syria. These girls were Amira Abase and Shamima Begum, both fifteen, and their classmate, 
Kadiza Sultana, sixteen. The three girls were outstanding pupils at London’s Bethnal Green 
Academy in Tower Hamlets, a rapidly growing community with a heavy concentration of 
immigrants. Family members described the girls, detailing their favorite TV shows and hobbies 
and speaking of their high academic achievements. While not the first of such recruits, the trio 
quickly became the face of the new recruitment efforts by IS. Since their arrival in Syria, at least 
two of them have been married to IS fighters (Dodd and Khomami, 2015). Amira is the most 
vocal of the trio, using social media to post updates glorifying life under IS and trying to recruit 
more girls like herself. 
Since the departure of these girls, experts have tried to understand their radicalization 
process, examining the possible explanations of radicalization by a relative, the school, or an 
outside contact. According to the principal of the school, it was impossible that the girls were 
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radicalized there, stating that access to social media is blocked on school property (“Syria girls: 
Trio 'not radicalised' at Bethnal Green Academy.”, 2015). However, concern has been voiced 
over some of the school staff and their ideological affiliations, noting that some have been 
involved with radical organizations within the UK and abroad. There are also reports that 
Shamima contacted a well-known woman from IS who had also left the UK for Syria about a 
year and a half prior (“Syria girls: Trio 'not radicalised' at Bethnal Green Academy.”, 2015). This 
was shortly before the trio left the country, and suggests that a peer network may have been 
influential in their radicalization. In addition, another friend and classmate from Bethnal Green 
had also left for Syria just a few months before. 
Given the example above, this research seeks to answer the why question by examining 
three related areas. First, pre-existing radicalization theories are evaluated to decide if they 
accurately account for the involvement of female foreign fighters. Second, possible motivations 
are investigated for why these young women are leaving their homes in the United Kingdom to 
join a movement in Syria, even though many have no prior connections to the country. Third, the 
appeal of  IS and their ideologies on this demographic is examined. 
Literature Review  
Before delving into an overview of the theories, a clarification of terminology is 
requisite. Fundamentalist Islam will be defined as the “the belief or advocating of a conservative 
adherence to literal or traditional interpretations of the Qu'ran and the Sunnah” (Collins 
Dictionary, 2015). This may lead to extremism-adoption of a position that lies on the fringes of 
the ideological spectrum. Extremism may or may not lead to extremist acts of terrorism. 
Terrorism, as referred to in this research, will utilize the definition provided by the United States 
Department of State, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
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noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience.” (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003, 120). The term, noncombatants, refers to not only 
civilians but also “military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in 
a war zone or a war-like setting.” (Legislative requirements and key terms, 2005, 9). When 
combined with an Islamic religious perspective, this is the definition of salafi-jihadism . This is a 
fundamentalist approach to practicing Islam with an aspect of violence, advocating for the 
overthrow of all governments that are not adhering to the teachings of the Prophet and Sharia law 
(Stern and Berger, 2015, xii-xiii). It is important to note that abiding by an extremist ideology is 
not necessarily correlated with committing acts of terrorism. One merely becomes more 
vulnerable to committing such acts in an effort to bring about the desired changes. 
A new dimension to this extremist problem is the foreign fighter complex, a phenomenon 
that has existed for centuries, though mostly focused on male participation. Even though foreign 
fighters are often associated with jihadists such as the mujahideen, they are not strictly an Islamic 
phenomenon, as demonstrated by Malet (2010). In his research, Malet (2010) cites several 
examples of American heroes who would also be considered foreign fighters, people such as 
Davy Crockett who left the United States to fight in the Mexican territory of Texas 
(Malet,  2010, 99). Adding complexity to this issue is the emerging recruitment of female foreign 
fighters by IS from the Muslim immigrant community in the UK It is a unique and concerning 
phenomenon, one that cannot be explained by conventional theories on extremist recruitment.  
Existing Theories on Extremist Recruitment 
In counter-extremism studies, there are four theories that attempt, with varying levels of 
success, to offer explanations for why individuals adopt extremism and go on to commit terrorist 
acts, namely Poverty, Illiteracy, Cultural Alienation, and Transnational Ideology. The first two 
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are the most prevalent in official foreign counter-extremism programs; the latter two are newer 
theories which are more applicable to this case study. 
 
Poverty as a Push Factor 
The first of these theories is predominant in counterterrorism. It sees extremist 
movements as arising from the impoverished masses. As J. Brian Atwood states, there is a 
“strong correlation between the absence of material well-being and the prospects for violence” 
(Atwood, 2003, 160). Quoting research done by the World Bank, he goes on to say that the 
material divide in a country can lead not only to political instability within a nation state, but can 
also create animosity between developed and developing countries (Atwood, 2003, 160). 
However, terrorism as a direct result of poverty is more difficult to substantiate than merely the 
existence of a higher probability of incidence of violence in poverty conditions. Regardless, it is 
known that terrorist organizations frequently recruit their manpower from this demographic 
(Atwood, 2003, 161), using economic benefits as leverage. Thus, instead of viewing socio-
economic inequality and lack of access to resources as the causes of terrorist activity, they should 
be viewed as two of several factors that can increase a population’s vulnerability to their appeals. 
As stated by Asef Bayat, “the poor cannot afford to be ideological” and “to be ideological 
requires certain capacities (time, risk-taking, money) that the disenfranchised often lack” (Bayat, 
2013, 201).  
Lack of Education as a Push Factor 
The second theory for extremism holds that a lack of education can make a population 
vulnerable to its appeals. This common view is held by many, including those in government. 
Colin Powell once stated that “that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where 
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there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives.” (Berrebi, 
2007, 3). John O. McGinnis writes that “Ignorance and poverty are the greatest friends of the 
terrorist, because the ignorant and impoverished are easy prey for the conspiracy theories and 
millennial religious visions that are staple of the Islamic fanatics.” (McGinnis, 2003). However, 
one of the main drawbacks for this theory is that statistics do not support it. Multiple studies have 
shown that terrorists tend to be educated. For instance, in research conducted by Hassan among 
Palestinian suicide bombers, all were educated and none were impoverished (Hassan, 2001). 
Other studies surveyed terrorists from a variety of national backgrounds, including several 
European countries and Turkey, and found that they all shared a tendency to possess high levels 
of formal education (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, 141). Other researchers see terrorism as a 
mode of political participation, albeit a violent one. Political participation, they argue, is a 
common trait among educated individuals and terrorism is simply another expression of it 
(Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, 142).  
Cultural Alienation of Immigrant 
While the previous theories attempt to explain the radicalization and involvement in 
foreign fighting, they fail to explain why many extremists are neither poor nor illiterate. 
Furthermore, they do not explain why a poor, uneducated individual with no prior ties to a 
country, its struggle or its dominant ideology will join an extremist movement. This policy 
response vacuum can be filled by a relatively underutilized theory of foreign fighter recruitment 
that focuses on the cultural alienation of the immigrant.  
Once an individual adopts an extremist viewpoint, they may become radicalized enough 
to seek deeper involvement which may involve foreign fighting. However, Malet (2010) argues 
that in order to be a foreign fighter, one must be recruited from outside of the country in which 
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the conflict is taking place. Thus, there has to be an underlying motivation to join which takes 
the form of a shared transnational identity, linking the foreigner with the fighters in the conflict. 
Motivations to join can be encouraged through a shared religious affiliation (Malet, 2010, 99-
100) of the country in conflict and the foreign recruit. Thus, while radicalization may not directly 
cause an individual to leave their home to join in a conflict, foreign fighter recruitment could 
also attract people who have held those beliefs for a long time. Diaspora communities are 
particularly vulnerable to this, due to their shared ethnic, ideological, and religious ties that 
transcend the physical borders of the state.  
Transnational Religious Ideology 
The final reason is the presence of a transnational religious ideology. This is perhaps the 
most applicable theory to this case study. Adherence to a transnational religious ideology can 
provide a personal identity that individuals may feel that they are otherwise lacking, especially in 
an immigrant community. Taking part in a shared religious faith can provide this identity and 
help them to define themselves in a country where they may feel othered by the citizens of both 
the sending and receiving countries. This hypothesis derived from records of interviews with 
former radical Muslims from the UK and research done in a fundamentalist Islamic group, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir  (HuT), which has a strong presence in the UK. Malet (2010) also hints at it in his 
research, quoting former jihadists who describe the appeal of fundamentalist Islam in their lives. 
One of these men states that they were ‘‘Men who had no home. Men reviled in the West 
because they were not white and Christian, and reviled at home because they no longer dressed 
and spoke like Muslims.” (Malet, 2010, 109). In the context of recruitment, he also says that 
“Transnational ideological affiliation was a highly salient identity because immigration and 
modernization had destroyed other communal ties and produced isolated, embattled individuals” 
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(Malet, 2010, 109). Alienation, which can make them vulnerable to the appeal of radical 
ideology (Richardson, 2006, 69), can play a key role in these diaspora communities.  
These are just a sampling of the theories for why some people become radicalized or 
assume a position of extremism. There is also significant variation in the process of choosing to 
become a foreign fighter; they can pursue different paths but they all have a common thread. 
Each path involves radicalization at some point. The first two theories say that radicalization 
stems from a social or educational disadvantage. The third theory posits that foreign fighter 
involvement comes from an appeal to a shared transnational identity. This could be religious 
(radicalized or not), ethnic, or otherwise.  However, none of these theories fully applies to the 
case study at hand. Thus, the fourth option is the most applicable here. While it is true that none 
are mutually distinctive, I argue that it is more of a matter of reordering the pieces. Whereas the 
first two theories posit that it is poverty and ignorance that can contribute to someone turning to 
extremism, I contend that it is a search for personal meaning and identity. This identity can then 
become a transnational one, which can lead to foreign fighter recruitment as described by Malet. 
I posit that this is what is taking place in the case of the young female British recruits to IS.  
The Role of Religion and Alienation in the Extremist Appeal  
Religion, and in this case, Islam, can provide a unifying force for extremist groups. As 
Richardson states, “it provides a unifying, all-encompassing philosophy or belief system that 
legitimizes and elevates their actions.” (Richardson, 2006, 63). Religious extremist groups have 
the tendency to be more violent as well, as they can claim divine permission for their 
behavior(Richardson, 2006, 61). Changing the existing government from secularism to one of 
Islamic principles is usually among the goals of Islamic fundamentalists. To this end, they prey 
upon the alienation of Muslims by promising a better future once the new government is 
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achieved (Richardson, 2006, 67). Thus, while Islam is not culpable for causing terrorism, it can 
be the vehicle for creating transnational ties that can motivate a person to leave their home and 
take sides in a foreign conflict (Richardson, 2006, 68).  
This alienation can also lead to a cultural reactionary push back. Experiencing rejection 
from the receiving nation’s culture can lead a population to be vulnerable to the appeal of ultra-
orthodox teachings and can result in a complete rejection of the host country’s culture. Instead of 
gradually assimilating into the receiving culture, they instead create a parallel culture, based 
upon either their heritage or the perceptions of that heritage. This is seen occurring in Muslim 
migrant communities within the UK. One example is Tower Hamlets, the hometown of the 
Bethnal Green trio. Termed “Jihadi Cool” by the popular media, it is a complete rejection of 
everything Western and is the latest cultural youth trend. The more devout one appears, the more 
‘in’ they are. Ironically, though, some of the strongest proponents of this “rejection of all things 
deemed Western” utilize the latest fashionable social media platforms to target their audience 
(McCaul, 2014). They also are co-opting other facets of pop culture to spread their message, 
posting jihadi rap videos to YouTube and distributing t-shirts with slogans glorifying jihad 
(Chumley, 2014). Thus, it is clear that at least part of the allure of “Jihadi Cool” is a form of 
cultural self-redefinition that occurs in other cultures as well. However, in this situation and with 
a militant form of Islam, the result is more threatening than in other cases.  
Data and Methods 
To examine whether the aforementioned religious appeal and cultural alienation theories 
apply to female foreign recruits, I collected and analyzed data on young British Muslim women 
who have left or been detained in attempting to leave the UK to join IS. Whereas it is much more 
common to see men joining foreign military movements, the participation of women as foreign 
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fighters has had little historical precedent. The UK has been selected for this study as it has 
experienced an alarming and significant number of such cases.  
This research consists of a media review, examining the issue of this recent recruitment 
trend. The data is collected from newspaper editorials published in news sources including the 
BBC, The Washington Times, The Atlantic, The New York Times, and the Guardian. These 
sources span the ideological spectrum, offering differing perspectives on the same topic or case 
and avoiding the distortion of political viewpoints in reporting. Some of these online newspaper 
articles included embedded video footage and commentary on the women, which proved helpful 
as well. Through the use of such sources, I sought to construct an idea of each young woman’s 
life, economic status, ethnic background, and path to radicalism. I also incorporate published 
interviews with the remaining family members of these girls.  
In collecting and examining these resources, I analyzed them for any common themes 
that could give clues to their paths to adopting extremist views and acting upon them. These 
themes include criteria such as age at time of departure, ethnic background, and degree of 
observed religiosity. These were noted for each of the subjects and were of particular importance 
as they provided the necessary evidence to counter the radicalization theories discussed 
previously. Commonalities within the data were noted and efforts made to draw accurate 
conclusions. I also attempted to determine any common individuals, institutions or alternate 
sources that these women have taken to reach the point of radicalization. For example, through 
using available sources, I sought to determine methods of radicalization/recruitment and whether 
there was a common peer network or a radicalized family member involved. 
The results of this media review were then compared and contrasted to the arguments in 
the literature review. These results gave insight to an under-examined element of the foreign 
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fighter phenomenon - the engagement and experiences of women. This was in order to determine 
whether the prominent theories in the field of anti-terrorism research were applicable here. 
Preliminary Argument/Hypothesis 
I am arguing that the preexisting theories on radicalization and adopting extremist 
ideology are not applicable to the case of the young British Muslim women that have responded 
to the appeal of IS. Examination of the data corroborate this idea. Popular ideas offered for 
adopting extremist views include poverty and a lack of education, among other things. This has 
not been the case for these women. At least several of them have been young women with 
exceedingly bright futures ahead of them; young women who were attaining high academic 
achievements and had promising opportunities for advancement. These findings are substantiated 
by research done by other terrorism experts such as Hassan (cited above) and Horgan (2014) 
who  found that those who adopt extremist views often have at least completed high school 
education (Horgan, 2014, 67). However, it is true that these findings can vary geographically.  
My argument in the current case is that the young women are turning to the form 
of  Islam that is  espoused and glorified by IS in an effort to create an identity that they feel they 
are lacking, growing up in an immigrant context. I posit that this type of faith is leaving them 
vulnerable to the appeal of IS and is what differentiates them from the thousands of other law-
abiding, peaceful Muslims residing in the UK. It is not an issue of Islam itself, but rather how it 
is practiced that can become dangerous. I further contend that the appeal of IS to these women 
comes from the current societal culture in which these women are growing up. It is a culture that 
rejects everything associated with Western ideology and sees pure Islam as “cool”. This leaves 
them especially vulnerable to the ideological appeals of an organization that is calling for the 
reestablishment of a pure Islamic caliphate. 
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Presentation and Analysis of Data 
In the process of the collection of the data for this research, it has been interesting to note 
both the existence and lack of certain trends. By this, I mean the commonalities that group them 
together as a subject group and the differences that at the same time cause them to retain their 
humanness and uniqueness. While many of them share an immigrant background, there are a 
few, such as Sally Jones, who would be termed ethnically British and are not acting from an 
immigrant context. Thus, it is clear from the beginning that the appeal of IS is not limited to 
those who have grown up as first or second generation British. There are also various 
nationalities represented among the data, as subjects come from Sudan, Somalia, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Ethiopia.  
Economic Background 
Economic deprivation does not seem to be a push factor for radicalization or departure to 
Syria.  Instead, the opposite seems to be true. As in the case of Aqsa Mahmood, a high profile 
recruiter from Glasgow, her family was described as “comfortably middle class” (Randall, 
2014). Financially prosperous, her family lives in a reputable neighborhood in an expensive 
house and sent Aqsa to a prestigious private girls’ school for a number of years (Dettmer, 2014). 
Another girl, Lena Mamoun Abdelgadir, also came from a well-to-do family. Similar to Aqsa, 
Lena’s family also sent her to an expensive girls’ school for years until she graduated and 
entered medical school (Farmer, 2015). Lena has since accompanied a group of eight other 
medical students and graduates from a medical school in Sudan on a trip to Syria. Their 
motivations are unclear. While it could be entirely humanitarian in nature, it is known that some 
of those in the group had at least been exposed to radical teaching while at the medical school 
(Bennhold, 2015).  
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Degree of Religiosity 
Of the nineteen women and girls on whom data was gathered for this study, most were 
Muslim by familial background. Of the group, there were two who are known to be recent 
converts to Islam. These women are Sally Jones and Kadijah Dare. The first woman, Sally Jones, 
is an outlier in many ways to the rest of the women who have left Britain to join IS. In her mid-
forties and ethnically British, Jones is neither young nor was she raised with an immigrant 
Muslim background. For a number of years in the 1990s, this single mother of two played guitar 
in a female rock band, flaunting miniskirts and blond hair. This is a significant departure from 
the black burqa and gloves that she now wears in her Twitter photos. Her neighbors described 
her behavior as erratic, recalling her male friends and the bizarre things that she did, including 
the instances in which she believed she was a witch. Then she met online and fell in love with 
Junaid Hussain, the young computer hacker from Britain who was charged with murdering 
James Foley (Greenwood, 2014). Hussain, who was young enough to be Jones’ son, had left the 
UK to fight for IS. Jones followed some time later in 2013 (Whitehead, 2015). They were 
married after her arrival and lived together until a drone strike specifically targeted her husband 
in August, 2015. She has been very active on IS social media, frequently tweeting messages 
about the glories of her husband’s martyrdom and her desire to behead Christians with a “dull 
knife” (Whitehead, 2015). Currently, there are fears that she may be preparing to become a 
female suicide bomber for IS, given a recent threat that she made in her Twitter feed (Newman, 
2015).  
Kadijah Dare, the other convert to Islam, is not as extreme as Jones. The daughter of 
Christians, she had migrated from Nigeria to the UK as a child. She was a devout Christian until 
her college years, when she began attending a mosque and converted (Styles, 2015). In 2012, she 
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left for Syria, taking her young son with her. Shortly after arriving, she married a Swedish IS 
fighter known as Abu Bakr, who has since been killed (Piggott, 2016). MI6, the British 
intelligence agency, views her as one of the biggest threats emerging from IS, on account of her 
popularity and hostility in her social media posts (“White British girl who's now a 'celebrity 
jihadi'”, 2014). For instance, after the beheading of James Foley, she famously tweeted requests 
for another foreign journalist for her to behead, desiring to become the first woman in IS to 
execute a “UK or US terrorist” (Halliday, 2014).  
Aside from these two cases of converts, the remainder of the women investigated for this 
study are Muslim by background. However, their levels of religiosity varied. In the case of 
Shamima Begum, for instance, she is reported to not even have known how to pray (Ferguson, 
2015). Others did not even wear a hijab, the Muslim head scarf, until shortly before leaving the 
UK. This was true in the instance of Sharmeena Begum, the first girl from the Bethnal Green 
Academy to leave for IS-controlled territory (Sinmaz and Reid, 2015). 
Ethnic Background 
The nineteen subjects for this study were found to be from six different countries. Three 
of the women’s ethnic background could not be determined due to lack of information. However, 
the remainder came from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the United Kingdom, 
and Nigeria, with the majority being Somali. All had spent at least part of their lives in the UK 
and had existing ties to the country at the time of their departure to Syria.  
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Ethnicity is crucial to note as it cannot be argued that they have national ties to the 
country since none of the young girls and women were originally from Syria. Indeed, none of 
them even came from the Middle-Eastern countries surrounding Syria. Neither do they have any 
direct ethnic stake in the establishment of IS. Nevertheless, they are all immigrants in a foreign 
society and occupy a position that is relatively vulnerable to exploitation by the same societal 
structures that  IS is ideologically opposing. This shared link then explains the solidarity with a 
conflict that is not their own.  
Occupational Background 
At the time of each individual’s departure, the majority of the females were enrolled in 
school and performing well academically. Some forty percent were schoolgirls, with another 
twenty percent attending a university or medical school. This statistic is reflective of their age 
(discussed below). 
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A brief look at their occupations further strengthens the argument that these women were 
educated and relatively well-off. Their motivations to join IS cannot be adequately explained by 
either lack of education or the inability to enjoy a certain lifestyle or provide for basic needs. It 
follows, therefore, that there must be some non-economic factors providing the impetus for their 
decision to join. 
Age of Female Recruits 
At the time of departure, the majority of the females in the subject group were found to 
be between the ages of fifteen and twenty. A total of eleven of the subjects, over half of the 
group, were under the age of 25. This is an important fact to note as this age is often associated 
with a great deal of searching for a personal identity. 
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While it is normal for young people to go through a period of self-searching and 
redefinition, it is not normal for them to become involved in dangerous extremist activities as 
sponsored by IS. In the case of these young women and girls, they desire to fit in with the culture 
but the culture does not completely accept them. Thus, they create their own culture in a 
reactionary move against the mainstream culture. While not a new phenomenon, what is 
different in their case is that they are forming their counter-cultural identity in a militantly 
conservative form of Islam and in a radically militant movement associated with it.   
Recruitment Network 
Many of the women and young girls who left for Syria were friends of one another and 
did not travel alone. As in the example of the Bethnal Green schoolgirls, the three left together, 
sometime after their fourth friend had also left. This friend, in turn, is suspected to have been 
groomed for recruitment by Aqsa Mahmood (Randall, 2014). Now, of the Bethnal Green trio, 
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Amira Abase has been trying to recruit girls through her social media. This is an example of a 
peer recruitment network.  
Often times, sisters would become radicalized and leave together. This was the case for 
the Dawood sisters-Sugra, Zohra, and Khadijah. All three left the UK in May, 2015, with their 
nine children under the pretext of traveling to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes. They 
disappeared on the return trip and have since been reported being smuggled into Syria. It is also 
alleged that a brother had already left and was fighting in Syria. This is another example of how 
the recruitment network operates (“Bradford Dawood family 'split to cross Syria border'.”, 2015) 
and is similar to the case of the twins, Salma and Zarah Halane. Originally from Somalia, these 
sixteen-year-old girls were high achieving students until they ran away from home in June of 
2014, in route to Syria (Glendinning, 2014). Here, there could be two causes for their 
radicalization. Like the Dawoods, it is alleged that the twins’ older brother had already joined IS 
(Wagner, 2014) and there are rumors that Aqsa Mahmood could have been involved too 
(Randall, 2014).  
Conclusions 
This research has focused on the recruitment by IS of young British Muslim females 
growing up in an immigrant context. It looks at several of the explanations and theories of 
foreign fighter involvement including becoming radicalized and committing extremist acts. 
Specifically, it evaluates the theories that material deprivation and poverty and a lack of 
education cause an individual to adopt extremism. These theories have been proven to be 
inapplicable here, as the majority of the subjects were highly educated and did not appear to be 
suffering from the effects of poverty. Thus, alternative theories were offered to explain their 
motives for joining IS. Drawing upon research done on the foreign fighter complex, it suggests 
IJOIS Spring 2016, Volume I 
Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security 
39 
 
that the motivating reasons stem not from a lack of material resources or attainment of education, 
but rather a transnational identity based in some shared identity- religious, ethnic, or ideological. 
I argue further that these women are grasping this opportunity to develop their sense of identity 
by participating in an international group. By so doing, they are taking this shared identity, 
religious in this case, and by participating in it, creating their own personal identities. Thus, 
adherence to, and participation in, some style of an orthodox form of Islam constitutes the basis 
of their personal identity and provides them with the impetus for joining a foreign conflict.  
The data gathered for this research seems to corroborate this. Most of the subjects were 
young at the time of departure, an age at which it is common to question and to struggle to define 
one’s personal identity. They also were mostly of immigrant backgrounds, either being first-
generation Britons or moving there during their childhood. Sixty percent were pursuing some 
type of educational degree, most with excellent school track records. With the exception of Sally 
Jones, none appear to have been on economically difficult times. These two findings rule out the 
relevance of the first two theories for explaining the causes of extremism.  
Therefore, I argue that it is instead a search for a personal identity that is propelling these 
girls and young women to join IS. Growing up in an immigrant context, they identify fully with 
neither their country of origin nor the country in which they grew up. Hence, they turn to other 
alternatives to find their identity, in this case an ultra-orthodox form of Islam. This imperils them 
to the appeals of radical extremist groups such as IS. 
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